Making America Great Again - for the first time: contextualising the advance of modern American Conservatism
The polarising rallying cry to "Make America Great Again" defined Trump's ascendancy to presidency in 2016. This call for political mobilisation on the basis of a reactionary impulse to perceived socio-political ills was not a novel political rhetoric, but rather the implementation of an impetus that defined the advance of conservatism in the second half of the twentieth century. The phrase itself was coined in Reagan's 1980 presidential campaign[1]. Reactionism in modern US politics can be viewed as a mechanism in service of opposing social, political and economic change, heavily associated with a strong conservative political perspective. A glass half full perspective of the popularisation of modern conservative politics in the 1970s and 80s may champion the nascent ideological counter-mobilisation of conservatism as a political thought. Conversely, a glass half empty perspective on the popularisation of conservatism as a political affiliation would emphasise the reactionary machinations of the rise of the movement, arguing that, rather than a strong identification with conservative ideology, conservative rhetoric was popularised due to a reactionary impulse against progressive change in the latter half of the century.
This article aims to explore the role of backlash against liberalism and the prominent 1960's social and political movements in the advance of modern American conservatism. It will be concluded that whilst the counter-mobilisation of conservatism in reaction to New Deal liberalism underpinned the ideological foundations of the movement, the reactionary impulse against the social and political movements stemming from the social upheaval of racial hierarchy, gender and religion in the 1960s, in conjunction with the economic crisis of the 1970's, was what ultimately changed the political context necessary to garner sufficient political capital for the advance of a conservatism - a delineation of a half-empty glass.
The 1960s were a time of socio-political tumult, forging an increasingly radical 'rights revolution' that challenged the culturally hegemonic status quo regarding racial, gender, and economic privilege[2]. This cultural zeitgeist resulted in increased polarisation, exacerbated by domestic political tensions surrounding the Vietnam War, and the rise of political radicalism as movements splintered to radical factions, spearheaded by the New Left that aimed to revolutionise the social order[3]. The escalation of liberalism in American society also redefined the conventional understanding of the role of government. Upon the foundations of FDR's New Deal, which provided extensive governmental authority to empower the economic capacity of Americans, LBJ's expansion of the welfare state and subsidisation of education and healthcare solidified liberal functions in American domestic policy.
The orthodox historiographical perspective of conservatism in the context of twentieth century American politics is defined as a coalition of traditionalist and libertarian sentiment with a propensity for increased militarism as an imperative governmental function - in both a foreign and domestic sense - to preserve order[4]. The advance of this conservatism in the latter half of the century is manifest with the rising popularity of traditionalist policy under Nixon, and most broadly and definitively evidenced first through and the rise of the New Right, epitomised by the election of conservative politician Ronald Reagan. The New Right was a coalition of fiscally conservative pro-market libertarians who opposed 'invasive' state regulation under the principles of New Deal liberalism, in conjunction with religiously motivated social conservatives who opposed "socialist secularism" and saw the decline of traditional heteropatriarchal family structures as a fundamental threat to the prosperity of the state.
Contemporary historiography of the foundations of US conservatism places a distinct emphasis on an intellectual tradition of free-market libertarianism, which argued that that the freedom of the market, which was " self-equilibrating [and] instantaneous in its sensitivities"[5], and the minimisation of governmental power, was essential for individual and societal liberty. Economic inflation and subsequent social distress were heralded by conservative economists such as Friedman as being "entirely made in Washington - and nowhere else"[6]. This ideology was championed by a minor but distinct grassroots coalition of conservatives. This is evidenced by the manifestation of the Young Americans for Freedom, a conservative youth organisation that mobilised around the causes, as lauded in their manifesto, the 1960 Sharon Statement, of a limited government whose main function is to defend individual liberty and social order[7]. The ideology was tested on a national scale with the presidential candidacy of staunch conservative Barry Goldwater. Goldwater's 1964 campaign was ultimately unsuccessful - conservative rhetoric, whilst supported by a grassroots base and intellectual underpinnings, failed to garner the support of the American public. Goldwater's conservative political platform against the "monolith of power" that was the expansive liberal state was markedly similar to the politics with which Reagan ultimately ascended to presidency[8]. This political failure suggests that a change in political context, in conjunction with the establishment of a broader coalition of support, was necessary for the popularisation and advance of conservatism.
The social and political movements of the late 1960s instigated the proliferation of a distinct class of white, suburban, and middle-class Americans who were alienated by socio-political upheaval and deeply fearful of shifts away from cultural norms. Racially segregated geographic and socioeconomic outcomes plagued American society - discrimination and deindustrialisation of urban areas, in conjunction with white flight to 'suburbia' and the resultant decline in tax bases for urban areas, left Black Americans in a cycle of de facto racism and reduced economic opportunity; "a bitter legacy that galvanised black protest"[9]. This resulted in increased radicalism and militancy as factions of the Black freedom struggle splintered, the hardening of white racial prejudices against civil rights and open housing, an increase in urban crime from a lack of "legitimate opportunity"[10] and an explosive increase in social unrest evidenced by brutal riots in predominantly black urban areas like Detroit in 1967[11]. A significant advance in conservatism thus arose through the popularity of "Law and Order" rhetoric amongst the white middle class. Nixon, whilst not a conservative ideologue, ascended to presidency as a protector of the "silent majority" of disaffected white Americans. Police militancy was rapidly escalated by Reagan, who promised the re-establishment of traditionalism in a racially codified appeal to the hegemonic social order of the 40s and 50s. Murch emphasises how an expanded and hypermilitarised police authority and the "War on Drugs" such as Reagan's 1986 Anti-Drug Abuse Act further popularised the conservative platform as a necessary reaction to the radical social movements that stemmed from the 1960s[12]. "Law and Order" conservatism, in reaction to the social upheaval of the 1960s, thus became a cornerstone of conservative advancement.
The social movements of the 1960s that were intimately related to challenging the heteropatriarchal nuclear familial structure, notably the emergent radical feminist movement, can be identified as the catalyst of what social conservatives denounced as "secular humanism". This was characterised by organisations such as the Redstockings, who objected to the social position of women as an oppressed class denigrated to the role of " sex objects, breeders, domestic servants", and a wider sexual revolution that challenged established traditional sexual and reproductive morality and promoted sexual liberation and expression. Religiosity was also declining rapidly due to a cultural shift against the moral influence of organised religion. This was seen as liberalism enabling the destruction of American values through a vortex of moral permissiveness and societal decay[13]. Televangelist and conservative leader Jerry Falwell, founder of the "pro-family" Moral Majority movement, proclaimed the "three-fold responsibility" of evangelical ministers was to "get people saved... baptised...[and] registered to vote"[14]. A growing coalition of socially conservative leaders saw the political organisation of religious constituents as "a responsibility, not just a right" in order to assuage the social destruction wrought by secular humanism[15]. Livingston emphasises how American culture as a whole was becoming more secular and liberal subsequent to the 1950s[16]. However, due to the electoral structure of the US, where voting is not compulsory (with only 54% of the eligible population voting in the 1980 election)[17], this dedication to political mobilisation elucidates the significance of social conservatives as an influential voting bloc to advance conservatism politically. Furthermore, backlash to this perceived erosion of fundamental socioreligious values enabled the unification of social conservatives who were previously divided along sectarian lines, such as Catholicism and Protestantism. These religious sects effectively began to garner political capital as a unified Religious Right - a core faction of the conservative coalition - due to the threat of secular humanism.
However, the reactionary backlash to socio-political and liberal developments of the 1960s does not entirely explain the ascent of conservatism to the ideological mainstream in the US politics. The economic crisis which crippled the American economy in the 1970s was necessary to contextualise 'failures' of liberalism as a function of economic regulation. The post-war economic boom, which had provided unprecedented industrial power, affluence and opportunity, previously contextualised economic policy for Americans. The economic crisis of the 70s ended this period of economic exceptionalism. Mounting inflation, high unemployment, and sluggish economic growth, coupled with crises such as the exponential growth of food and energy costs due to the 1973 oil embargo placed on the US, legitimised traditional conservative critiques of the expansive governmental policies in a broader political context. The nation's "uncertain economic future" also further denigrated normative heteropatriarchal structures and exacerbated the cultural crisis surrounding the future of the American family ideal. The decline in the family wage rate and rapid inflation reduced standards of living for the working and middle class and pushed many mothers into the paid workforce[18]. Mainstream news media, aided by coordinated efforts from socially conservative leaders who saw liberal governmental involvement in the domestic sphere, not the "destabilising effects of market capitalism", as the cause of this societal decay, ultimately defined the parameters of public perception of the issue and popularised key socially conservative ideological tenets[19]. Thus, the economic crisis period of the 1970s was paramount in challenging the perceived viability of liberalism and legitimising the conservative platform.
Ultimately, whilst backlash against liberalism and the social and political movements of the 1960s contributed significantly to the advance of conservatism, the social polarisation and reorientation of traditionalism and order was not the sole impetus for conservative ascendency. Conservatism had a minor yet established ideological foundation and grassroots support base that existed prior to the popularisation of reactionism towards liberalism and socio-political movements. Furthermore, economic crisis conditions were necessary to recontextualise contemporary economic and political debates surrounding the merits of conservative ideological tenets in order for the movement to advance. With a glass as a reflection of varying historiographical perspectives on the advance of modern American conservatism, it is crucial to acknowledge that historical narratives are seldom black or white - half-empty or half-full. The interplay between inherent ideological principles and reactionism underscores the complexity of political change. The fluidity of historical processes invites us to explore the intricate dynamics that have shaped the trajectory of political movements. In this sense, the multifaceted historical developments ultimately mobilised conservative constituency and reshaped the United State's socio-political landscape in the late 20th century.
Footnotes
[1]“Donald Trump Declares That He Will Make America Great Again, Again,” The Economist, accessed November 5, 2023, https://www.economist.com/united-states/2022/11/17/donald-trump-declares-that-he-will-make-america-great-again-again.
[2] Alice Echols, “Women’s Liberation and Sixties Radicalism Actions,” in Natasha Zaretsky at al, eds., Major Problems in American History Since 1945, fourth edition (New York: Cengage, 2014), 275.
[3] Maurice Isserman and Michael Kazin, “The New Left,” America Divided: The Civil War of the 1960s (New York: Oxford University Press, 2021), 178–84.
[4] Michael Kimmage, “The Historiography of Twentieth-Century American Conservatism,” January 30, 2014, 1-2, https://doi.org/10.1093/obo/9780199756223-0080.
[5] Daniel T. Rodgers, “The Rediscovery of the Market,” Age of Fracture (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2011), 42.
[6] Rogers, Age of Fracture, 52.
[7] Eric Foner, “The Sharon Statement,” Voices of Freedom: A Documentary History (New York: Norton, 2016), 289.
[8] Barry M. Goldwater, The Conscience of a Conservative (Shepardsville, KY: Victor Publishing Company, 1960), 24.
[9] Thomas Sugrue, "The Continuing Racial Crisis," in Zaretsky et al, eds., Major Problems in American History Since 1945 (Stamford, CT: Cengage Learning, 2014), 153-156.
[10] Sugrue, "The Continuing Racial Crisis," 154.
[11] Sugrue, "The Continuing Racial Crisis," 152.
[12] Donna Murch, Crack in Los Angeles: Crisis, Militarization, and Black Response to the Late Twentieth- Century War on Drugs, No. 1 Historians and the Carceral State, Vol. 102, The Journal of American History (Oxford University Press, 2015), 164-171; Patrick McGrath, "Race, Crime and Policing in
Modern America," October 4, 2023.
[13] Frances Fitzgerald, The Evangelicals: The Struggle to Shape America (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2017), 291 - 292.
[14] Matthew Lassiter, "Inventing Family Values," in Bruce Schulman and Julia Zelizer, eds., Rightward Bound: Making America Conservative in the 1970s (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2008), 13.
[15] Jerry Falwell, "Listen, America!" (1980, excerpt) in Eric Foner, ed., Voices of Freedom: A Documentary Reader, fifth edition (New York: Norton, 2016), 322.
[16] James Livingston, The World Turned Inside Out: American Thought and Culture at the End of the 20th Century (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2010).
[17] Who votes? Congressional elections and the American electorate: 1978–2014, accessed November 5, 2023, https://www.census.gov/content/dam/Census/library/publications/2015/demo/p20-577.pdf.
[18]Lassiter, "Inventing Family Values," 14.
[19] Lassiter, "Inventing Family Values," 15.